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'THE LIABILITY OF A CARRIER UNDER A BILL OF LAD-
ING WHEN THE GOODS HAVE NOT BEEN 
RECEIVED BY THE CARRIER. 
T HE coming into force on January I, 1917 in the United States of the FEDERAL BILL OF LADING Acr1 has given new interest 
to a question which was at one time much debated, namely : 
should a carrier whose shipmaster or agent has signed a bill of lad-
ing ·be liable to an innocent holder for value of such bill of lading if 
the carrier can show that the goods were never shipped? 
As this Ac~ overrules the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, \vhich adopted the reasoning of the English court in the much-
discussed case of Grant v. Nor-&ay,2 and as we in Canada by court 
decisions and later by statute followed Grant v. Norway, it may be 
interesting to review the English, Canadian and American cases. 
English Cases. 
Prior to Grant v. Norway was Berkley v. Watling.3 In this case 
LI'.l''tLEDALE, J. says: 
"He puts in a bill of lading which certainly appears to be 
signed by the master; but, on the face of it the goods are 
shipped by Watling. Then the plaintiff must prove Watling 
to be his agent : by doing so he supports the allegation. It 
turns out that, in fact, the goods were not shipped on board 
the ship at all. But the plaintiff says that the defendants, 
Nave and Crisp, are estopped from shewing this, by the bill 
of lading, signed by their own agent. How are they estopped? 
Watling knew the fact and his knowledge is the plaintiff's 
knowledge.. The plaintiff knowing the fact by Watling, his 
agent, how are the defendants, Nave and Crisp, estopped by 
what Watling does as their agent? Since, therefore, the 
plaintiff, as shipper, is cognizant of the facts, we need not 
say how far, on the general question, there is an estoppel. 
But in my opinion, the bill of lading is not conclusive." 
In Grant v. Norway' it was urged that the master is the general 
agent of the owner and that the most material part of the business 
.1 Public Act No. 239. Approved Aug. 29, I9I6. 
: (I852) IO C. B. 665. 
• (I837) 7 A. & E. 29"· 
' (I852) IO C. B-. 665. 
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is the signing of bills of lading and that by the owner's appointing 
him to a place of trust and confidence the owner should be re-
sponsible if an innocent person suffers an injury. It was also urged 
that bills of lading being by the custom of merchants commonly 
pledged and deposited as security for the payment of money, to hold 
that an indorser-who has no means of knowing whether the master 
has received the goods but takes it upon the faith of his signature,:_ 
has no remedy against the owner, would have the effect of destroy-
ing the negotiability of these instruments. 
J ltRVIS, C. J. for the Court said: 
"Is it then, usual, in the management of a ship carrying 
goods on freight, for the master to give a bill of lading for 
goods not put on board? for all parties concerned have a 
right to assume that an agent has authority to do all which 
is usual. The very nature of a bill of lading shows that it 
ought not to be signed until the goods are on boa.rd; for it 
begins by describing them as shipped. It was not contended 
that such a course is usual. It is not contended that the cap-
tain had any real authority to sign bills of lading, unless the 
goods had been s~ipped. Nor can we discover any ground 
upon which a party taking a bill of lading by endorsement 
would be justified in assuming that he had authority to sign 
such bills, whether the goods were on board or not." 
In Hubbersty v. Wards a distinction was attempted to be drawn 
between that case and Grant v: N on.va31. It was conceded by the 
counsel for the plaintiff that the master of a ship, who signs bills 
.of lading for goods which have never been shipped, is not the agent 
of the owner so as to render the owner responsible to persons who 
make advances upon the faith of the bills of lading so signed; but 
it was contended that the master being agent of the owner to give 
bills of lading for goods on board, and having acted carelessly in 
·performing his duty by giving a second bill of lading for the same 
·goods, the owner was liable by reason of such negligence; but it 
was held by the Court that when a captain has signed bills of lading 
·for a cargo that is actually on board his vessel, his power is ex-
hausted; and that he has no right or power by signing other bills 
of lading for goods that are not on board, to charge his owner. The 
·Ca!ie was held to be governed by Grant v. N or-&ay, the decision in 
-which was said by JERVrs, C. J. to be a mere illustration of a well 
' (1853) 8 Ex. 330. 
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known rule of law, namely, that an act done in fraudulent violation 
of authority conferred, cannot be said to be done, or be treated as 
done, within the scope of the authority conferred. 
In Coleman v. Richesc it was held that where the servant of a 
wharfinger fraudulently signed a receipt purporting to be an ac-
knowledgment that certain wheat had been delivered at his employ-
er's wharf to be shipped to the order of C., no such wheat having in 
fact been delivered, and thereby wilfully induced the plaintiff to 
pay the price thereof to the pretended vendor, the wharfinger was 
not liable, although it was proved that the plaintiff's course of deal-
ing was to pay for all wheat delivered for him at the wharf on the 
production by the ver1dor of the wharfinger's receipt, and that the 
latter knew it. One Board had colluded with the pretended vendor, 
and fraudulently gave the false receipt. It was proved that Board 
was the general agent of the defendant for transacting the business 
of the wharf, and it was proved to be the course of business there to 
give receip~s, like that in question, to indicate to the plaintiff that he 
might pay the money. The case was held to be governed by Grant 
v. Norway, all these cases depending upon the scope of the author-
ity of the agent. JERVIS, C. J. says: "When Board gave a receipt 
for wheat which had never been delivered at the wharf, he was not 
acting within the scope of his authority : he was not acting for his 
master, but contrary to his duty, and against his master's interest." 
Then there is the case of Limpies v.London General Omnibus Co.,7" 
holding that it was a proper direction to the jury to say that, if the 
act of the defendant's driver, although reckless driving on his part~ 
was nevertheless an act done by him in the course of his service, 
and to do that which he thought best to suit the interests of his em-
ployers, and so to interfere with. the trade and business of the other 
omnibus, the defendants were responsible ; and that it was immate-
rial that the defendants had given him special instructions not to 
obstruct any omnibus ; but that if the act of the defendants' servant 
was an act of his own, and in order to effect a purpose of his own, 
the defendants were not responsible. 
Goff v. Great Northern R. W. Co.,8 and Poulton v. London & 
South Western R. W. Co.9 were decided upon the same principle as 
that which runs through the other cases referred to. The latter case 
was an action of trespass against the company for the illegal arrest 
e (1855) 16 C. B. l04. 
1 (1862) l H. & c. 526. ' 
• (1861) 3 E. & E. 672. 
• (1867) L. R. 2 Q. B. 534. 
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of a passenger by the company's servants, and it was held that as 
the company had no power to detain the plaintiff, there .could be 
no implied authority from them to their station-master to detain him 
so as to make the company liable for the act of the station-master 
in detaining him. 
English Stat1lte Law. 
In the year 1855, shortly after the decision in Grant v. Norway,10 
the English BILLS OF LADING Acr was passed. In §3 it is provided 
that · 
"Every bill of lading in the hands of a consignee or in-
dorsee for valuable consideration, representing goods to have 
been shipped on board a vessel, shall be conclusive evidence 
of such shipment as against the master or other person sign-
ing the same, notwithstanding that such goods or some part 
thereof may not have been so shipped, unless such holder of 
a bill of lading shall have had actual notice at the time of 
receiving the same, that the goods had not in fact been laden 
on board : provided that the master or other person so sign-
ing may exonerate himself in respect of such misrepresenta-
tion, by showing that it was caused without any default on 
his part, or wholly by the fraud of the shipper, or of the 
holder, or some person under whom the holder claims." 
Canadian Statute Law. 
By the Act 33 Viet. ch. 19 Ontario, the English Bill of Lading 
Act (in substance) was enacted with the addition in §3, after the 
words "on board a vessel" of the words "or train." 
Canadian Cases . . 
In 1877 the case of Oliver, Gibbs & Co. v. The Great Western 
Railway Conipany11 in appeal was decided. The plaintiffs at Mon-
treal agreed with Brown & Co. at Chatham, Ontario, for the pur-
chase of 500 barrels of flour, to be sent via defendants' railway and 
boat, and to be paid for by draft at IO days. Carruthers was de-
f,endants' freight agent at Chatham as was mentioned in the com-
pany's printed notices, naming certain places and agents where and 
to whom goods might be delivered for carriage and receipts given 
and he was also to defendants' knowledge, a member of the firm of 
10 (1852) IO c. B. 665. 
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Brown & Co. Carruthers gave a printed receipt or shipping note 
in the common form used by the defendants, which was filled in by 
him, and signed by one of their clerks by his direction as was the 
custom at the Chatham freight station. This receipt acknowledged 
that defendants had received from Brown & Co., 500 barrels of 
flour addressed to the plaintiffs to be sent by defendants ; and a draft 
was drawn by Brown & Co. to their order on the plaintiffs, and dis-
counted at the Merchants Bank of Canada on the faith of the at-
tached shipping note and then sent by the bank to Montreal, and 
accepted by plaintiffs on the faith of the shipping note. No flour 
was ever received by the defendants, the whole transaction being a 
fraud on the part of Carruthers. 
· The Court by GWYNNE, J, (GAI,T, J. concurring, HAGAR'rY, C. J. 
dissenting), after a careful review of the English cases held that de-
fendants were not liable, as it was not within the scope of Car-
ruthers' authority as defendants' freight agent to give false and 
fraudulent receipts for goods when none were in fact received. 
Defendants urged that the shipping note did not state the goods 
had been shipped but merely that they had been received to be sent. 
The Court whilst deciding the case must be decided irrespective of 
33 Viet. ch. 19, §3, Ontario, suggested that "although the effect may 
be to make the Act wholly inoperative against railway companies 
(notwithstanding the deliberate introduction of the word "train" 
into the third section), as it certainly will be, if the railway com-
panies should continue to give only receipts of this description, and 
shall not give any representing the goods to ha11e been shipped on 
board a train," Grant v. Norway,12 Hubbersty v. Ward,13 and Cole-
man v. Riches14 were held to be "conclusive authorities upon the 
case before us." 
HAGARTY, C. J. in his strong dissenting judgment attempts to dis-
tinguish Grant v. Norway and the other English cases relied on by 
GWYNNE, J. and says : 
"Stripped of all disguise, the defendants' contention is 
simply this. Vv e are responsible for our agent's acts and 
receipts only when the acts are right and the receipts true. 
To which the answer of the commercial public would be, that 
such a proposition, if sound, would release them from nine-
tenths of their every-day liabilities." 
11 (1877) 28 U. C. C. P. 143. 
:12 (1852) IO c. D. 665. 
13 (1853) 8 Ex. 330. 
" (1855) 16 C. D. 104. 
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That he felt strongly is shown by the concluding words of his 
-opinion: 
"We may assume the universal custom is, to accept such 
receipts as conclusive evidence of the matters there repre-
sented. It. will naturally surprise the commercial world to be 
told that it is not so, and that the holders for value of such 
receipts, and not the company, whose agent has signed for 
them, must suffer from the agent's fraud. 
"As a general rule any exposition of commercial law run-
ning counter to universal commercial understanding is to be 
much regretted, and only to be adopted on the clearest weight 
of reason and authority. 
"I think that, amongst other duties and obligations to the 
public, the law imposes on great common carrier companies 
the duty of employing faithful and honest agents. 
"I need hardly say that I hold these defendants liable not 
without hesitation and doubt. I fully admit the force of the 
argument in their favor. But I find no authority directly 
deciding the immunity of a corporation o_f carriers on such 
a state of facts as we have before us, and their non-liability 
is so utterly opposed to my ideas of right and wrong, and of 
the universal practice of the commercial world in such mat-
ters, that I shall wait until it is decided by some competent 
authority that such things can be done by agents without re-
dress from those who place such agents in positions of trust, 
and enable them to work such mischief to innocent parties. 
I think the plaintiffs should recover." 
An appeal was entered from the judgment of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas and it was agreed that this appeal should abide the result 
in the appeal from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench to 
the Court of Appeals in Erb et al. v. Great Western Railway Com-
pany.1G The facts were the same as in Oiiver, Gibbs & Co. v. Great 
Western Railway Company. 
In the Court of Appeals Moss, C. J. A. and BURTON, J. A., rely-
ing on Grant v. Norway, held that the defendants were not liable. 
Moss, C. J. A. said: "This case is interesting and remarkable not 
only for its great importance to our mercantile community, but for 
the extraordinary diversity of judicial opinion which its agitation 
has evoked both here and in the United -States. I confess that·my 
11 (1879) 3 o. A. R. 446. 
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own opinion has undergone many fluctuations, and that it is with 
great hesitation and difficulty I have arrived at a conclusion." 
PATTERSON, J. A. and BLAKE, V. C. held that the defendants were 
liable as they must be presumed to know the purpose for which such 
documents were intended, and were estopped, as against the plain-
tiffs, from denying the representations contained therein. In reply 
to the argument that these documents were not bills of lading be-
cause they did not name the cars which contained the grain-a bill 
of lading proper containing the name of the vessel on which the 
goods are laden-PATTERSON, J. A. sa1d: "f think these are bills 
of lading, not only because the defendants treat them as such, but 
because I do not consider the car the equivalent of the vessel. I 
think the railway must be taken to represent the vessel-including 
of course in the railway the cars and engines used in working it. It 
is the instrument by which the defendants convey freight-as the 
vessel is that of the carrier ·by water." 
BLAKE, V. C. said: "If we hold otherwise we shall virtually be 
saying that the bill of lading, for the chief object it is given, is value-
less, and that one advancing money on a cargo must, notwithstand-
ing his bill of lading, inform himself through some other agent or 
otherwise, whether the goods certified as shipped have in fact been 
shipped." 
PATTERSON, J. A., held bills of lading are not only intended as an 
assurance to the shipper, but as a representation to the "banker or 
private person" with whom the statute deals, that they may act on 
the faith of it, and advance their money. 
BURTON, J. A., referred to a number of American cases including 
Griswoldv. Haven10 and Farmers &c. Bank v. The I:Jzttcher's Bank,17 
of which latter case he says: "The judgment of the diss~nting judge 
commends itself to my mind as more consistent ,.,.'1th the established 
principles regulating the relations of principal and agent, and with 
the authority of decided cases in our own courts.'' 
As the Court was equally divided the appeal was dismissed. 
Erb et al. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada which 
held (FOURNIER and HENRY, J. J. dissenting), that the act of Car-
ruthers was not an act done within the scope of his authority as the 
company's agent. RITCHIE, C. J. delivered the judgment of the 
Court, TASCHEREAU, GWYNNE and STRONG concurring. 
HENRY, J. based his dissent on the principle expressed by STORY in 
his work on AGENCY (§ I27) where he says:-'·The maxim of na-
11 (186z) 25 N. Y. 595. 
17 (1857) 16 N. Y. 125. 
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tural justice here applies with its full force, that he who without 
intentional fraud, has enabled any person to do an act which must be 
injurious to himself or to another innocent party, shall himself suf-
fer the injury rather than the innocent party who has placed confi-
dence in him. The maxim is founded on the soundest ethics and is 
.enforced to a large extent by Courts of Equity." In a note to the 
section just mentioned, he says: "The principle which pervades all 
-cases of agency, whether it be a general or special agency, is this: 
The principal is bound by all acts of his agent within the scope of 
the authority which he holds him out to the world to possess. And 
this is founded on the doctrine that where one of the two persons 
must suffer by the act of a third person, he who has held that per-
son out as worthy of trust and confidence and having authority in 
the matter shall be bound by it." 
"This is the admitted doctrine in all courts in England, and the law 
in France holds the principal liable for the fraud of his agent in 
cases similar to this. See 20 LAURENT, p. 609, where he approves 
this doctrine as held by POTHIER. I might also cite in confirmation 
of it from the Roman law." 
"I have fully considered, as alleged to be applicable to this case, 
the law as between the endorser of a bill of lading for value signed 
by the master of a ship and the ship owner, which holds the latter 
not responsible for goods not shipped on board, but I think a differ-
ent principle is involved in respect to bills of lading signed by a 
general receiving agent of a railway company." 
This case was decided in I881. In l88g, 5:::i Viet. ch. 30 AN AcT 
.RELATING TO BILLS oF LAmNG was passed. This Act, still in force 
(R. S., I906, chap. l 18), is practically the same as the English Bu.LS 
OF LADING AcT except that it reads "on board a vessel or train" 
instead of merely "on board a vessel." 
On July 15, 1909 by General Order No .. p The Board of Railway 
Commissioners for Canada approved of two forms of bill of lading 
for use in Canada by all railway companies subject to the legislative 
authority of the Parliament of Canada. 
From inquiries made of Canadian railway companies it would 
appear that they have had very few cases of fraudulent bills of lad-
ing. There seems to be little if any agitation in Canada for a change 
in the law on this point, but it is worth noting that Mr. D. H. Ross, 
Canadian Trade Commissioner, in a report to the Department of 
'Trade and Commerce, dated at Melbourne, May 9, 1916, and pub-
lished in the \Veekly Bulletin of June 12, 1916, states that Australian 
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importers object to the "combined railway and steamer bill of lad-
ing." The report reads in part as follows: 
"Some of the leading importers of Canadian goods and 
. products have refused to accept or pay drafts supported by a 
combined railway and steamer bill of lading, as they claim 
that it is not a negotiable document because it absolutely 
gives no assurance when the goods will come to hand. Fur-
ther, it is not a receipt from the steamship company, and the 
various lines invoiced may come forward in several steamers 
thus entailing endless annoyance and trouble at the port of 
discharge. 
"In the case of iron and steel products shipped in bars or 
bundles, the combined bills of lading are indorsed by the rail-
way company 'shipper's load and count more or less,' which 
gives the Australian consignee no grounds against the steam-
er for redress for any material short landed, as the shipping 
agents contend that such an endorsement frees them from 
any claim for the missing products. 
"This combined bill of lading gives no guarantee whatever 
that the goods will ever be shipped intact from the seaboard, 
and hence it may he months after a portion of the invoice 
is delivered before the shipment is completed. 
"The opinion of a leading Melbourne banker upon the ob-
jection to the combined railway and steamer bill of lading 
was obtained, and is now submitted for the information of 
Canadian banks, manufacturers and exporters :-
"'From a banker's point of view the objection to the docu-
ment is that it is not a legal security in Australia. The 
Courts both in England and throughout the Commonwealth 
rule that a bill of lading is a valid instrument only when the 
goods are actually shipped. A bill of lading which does not 
show the name of the steamer is not a valid instrument and 
is therefore not a legal security. In Australia, even though 
the name of the steamer be inserted, the document is not nec-
essarily binding on a shipping company unless that particu-
lar steamer is in port at the time of date of issue of the bilf 
of lading. My objections may be summarized as under:-
" 'r. A banker negotiating a draft supported by such a 
document has no tangible security. 
" '2. He runs the risk of the drawee in Australia declin-
ing to pay until arrival of the relative goods. 
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"'3. No remedy is in the hands of the banker for goods 
short-shipped, and experience up to date shows that in con-
nection with combined railway and steamer bills of lading 
irregularities in shipment have been almost chronic. 
" 'It appears to me that an easy solution of the whole trou-
ble could be achieved by the negotiating bank of Canada. 
either declining to negotiate the draft until the goods were 
actually shipped, or offering to negotiate the draft on condi-
tion that interest during the period of delay between the date 
of negotiation and date of actual shipment should be paid by 
either the shipper in Canada or the consignee in Australia, or 
perhaps divide the interest, equally between the two, but it 
should be a sine qua non that the draft must be retained by 
the negotiating bank in Canada until actual date of shipment 
is assured'." 
Under date of August 22, 1916, the same fonker wrote as fol-
lows: 
"Referring to my previous letters on the subject of com-
bined railway and steamer bills of lading I may say that, 
although the same legal objection obtains here regarding these 
documents, namely that they are invalid in our courts of law 
unless at the date of issue the steamer to which they relate 
is actually in port, the difficulty has been got over, so far as 
the banks here are concerned, by the fact that practically every 
such document now reaches us ,accompanied by the guarantee 
of the negotiating ;bank,1 that is to say we are in the position 
that, in the event of our having to claim in respect of them, 
we have the support of the bank in Canada or the United 
States as the case may be." 
United States Federal Cases. 
As already stated, the Federal Courts adopted the reasoning of 
the English cases. An early case is The Schooner Freenian,18 in 
which it was said: 
"But the same reason applies to a signature made by a 
master out of the course of his employment. The taker as-
sumes the risk, not only of the genuineness of the signature, 
and of the fact that the signer was master of the vessel, but 
also of the apparent authority of the master to issue the bill 
of lading. We say the apparent authority, because any secret 
instructions by the owner, inconsistent with the authority 
:11 (1855) 18 How. 182. 
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with which the master appears to be clothed, would not affect 
third persons. But the master of a vessel has no more an 
apparent unlimited authority to sign bills of lading than he 
has to sign bills of sale of the ship. He has an apparent 
authority, if the ship ·be a general one, to sign bills of lading 
for cargo actually shipped; and he has authority also to sign 
a bill of sale of the ship when, in case of disaster, his power 
of sale arises. But the authority in each case arises out of, 
and depends upon, a particular state of facts. It is not an un-
limited authority." 
In the important case of Pollard v. Vinton,1° speaking of the char-
acter of a bill of lading, Chief Justice MILL'ER said: 
"It is an instrument of two-fold character. It is at once a 
receipt and a contract. In the former character it is an ac-
knowledgemeJ,J.t of the receipt of property on board his vessel 
by the owner of the vessel. In the latter it is a contract to 
carry safely and deliver. The receipt of the goods lies at 
the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver. If no 
goods are actually received, there can be no valid contract to 
carry or to deliver." 
And in discussing the powers of an agent and the functions of a 
carrier, he says: 
"Before the power to make and deliver a bill of lading 
could arise, some person must have shipped goods on the ves-
sel. Only then could there be a shipper, and only then could 
there be goods shipped. In saying this we do not mean that 
the goods must have been actually placed on the deck of the 
vessel. If they come within the control and custody of the 
officers of the boat for the purpose of shipment the contract 
of carriage had commenced, and the evidence of it in the 
form of a bill of lading would be binding. But without such 
a delivery there was no contract of carrying, and the agents 
of the defendant had no authority to make one. 
"They had no authority to sell cotton and contract for de-
livery. They had no authority to sell bills of lading. They 
had no power· to execute these instruments and go out and 
sell them to purchasers. No man had a right to buy such a 
bill of lading of them who had not delivered them the goods 
to be shipped." 
:10 (1881) I05 U. S. 1· 
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In the case of Iron Moitntain R. R. Co. v. Knight20 there is the 
:following reference to Grant v. Norway: 
"The ground of that decision, according to my view, was 
not merely that the captain has no authority to sign a bill of 
lading in respect of goods not on board, but that the nature 
and limitation of the captain's authority are well known among 
mercantile persons, and that he is only authorized to perform 
all things usual in the line of business in which he is em-
ployed." The court held that the doctrine of Grant v. Norway 
was "applicable to transportation contracts made in that form 
by railway companies and other carriers by land, as well as 
carriers by sea." 
' In Friedlander v. Ta.'!:as &c. Ry. Co.,21 the court said: 
"It is a familiar principle of law that where one of two 
innocent parties must suffer by the fraud of another, the 
loss should fall upon him who enabled such third person to 
commit the fraud, but nothing that the railroad company 
did or omitted to do can be properly said to have enabled 
Lahnstein to impose upon Friedlander & Co. The com-
pany not only did not authorize Easton to sign fictitious 
bills of lading, but it did not assume authority itself to 
issue such documents except upon the delivery of the mer-
chandise. Easton was not the company's. agent in the trans-
action, for there was nothing upon which agency could act. 
Railroad companies are not dealers in bills of exchange, 
nor in bills of lading; they are carriers only, and held to 
rigid responsibility as such. Easton, disregarding the ob-
ject for which he was employed and not intending by his 
act to execute it, but wholly for a purpose of his own and 
of Lahnstein, became particeps criminis with the latter in 
the commission of the fraud upon Friedlander & Co., and 
it would be going too far to hold the Company, under such 
circumstances, estopped from denying that it had clothed 
this agent with apparent authority to do an act so utterly 
outside the scope of his employment and of its own bus-
iness. The defendant cannot be held on contract as a com-
mon carrier, in the absence of goods, shipment, and shipper; 
nor is the rule maintainable on the ground of tort." 
"' (1887) 122 u. s. 79. 
21 (1889) 130 u. s. 416. 
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In the case of Missouri Railway v. lrfcFadden,22 the last de-
cision in the Supreme Court dealing with this question, a shipper 
had delivered his cotton to the compress company, and while in 
the possession of that company the agent of the railway had given 
a bill of lading with the unders~anding that when it was com-
pressed it was to be delivered to the railroad company. While 
the cotton was still in the possession of the compress company 
the building of the compress company burned down and the cotton 
was destroyed. V/ho was to suffer the loss? The railroad com-
pany or the party who had received the bill of lading which had 
been signed by the agent of the railroad company? Had there 
been a delivery to the railroad company? If so, the company 
would have been liable. 
Mr. Justice "WHITE said: 
"The elementary ·rule is that the liability of a common 
carrier depends upon the delivery to him of the goods 
which he is to carry. This rule is thus stated in the text-
books: 'The liability of a carrier begins when the goods 
are delivered to him or his proper servant authorized to 
receive them for carriage.' (Redfield on Carriers, 8o.) 
The duties and the obligations of the common carrier with 
respect to the goods commence with their delivery to him,. 
and this delivery must be complete, so as to put upon him 
the exclusive duty of seeing to their safety. The law wilf 
not divide the duty or the obligation between the carrier 
and the owner of the goods. It must rest entirely upon the 
one or the other, and until it has become imposed upon the 
carrier by a delivery and acceptance he can not be helcf 
responsible for them.'' 
Mr. Justice W:mTE added: 
"This doctrine is sanctioned by a unanimous course of 
. English and American decisions." 
The Court closes the discussion with the following statement, 
referring to the rights of third parties for value wi~hout notice:· 
"The rule thus stated is the elementary commercial rule. 
Indeed in the case last cited [referring to ·the Lady Frank-
lin Case] this court expressed surprise that the question· 
should be raised. These views coincide with the rulings 
of the· English Courts." 
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Cases in the State Courts. 
In National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago &c. Railroad Co.,23 
MrtcHELL, J. said: 
"It is * * * to be admitted that it requires some temerity 
to attack either the policy or soundness of a rule which seems 
to have stood the test of experience, which has been approved 
by so many eminent Courts, and under which the most suc-
cessful commercial nation in the world has developed and 
conducted her vast commerce ever since the inception of car-
riers' bills of lading. * * * Moreover, on questions of gen-
eral commercial law, the Federal Courts refuse to follow the 
decision of the State Courts, and determine the law according 
to their own views of what it is." 
In Roy & Roy v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co.24 the Supreme Court 
of vVashington, after an elaborate review of the authorities agreed 
with the decisions of the Federal Courts upon this question. 
As already stated the law 1n 25 States and Alaska either by court 
decision or statute makes the carrier liable to an innocent holder for· 
value of a bill of lading even if the goods described in the hill of 
lading were not delivered to the carrier and this also is the law in 
the principal commercial nations of the world. 
The reasoning of the state Courts which have held the carrier· 
liable is perhaps best illustrated by the decision of the New York 
Court of Appeals in Bank of Batavia v. N. Y., L. E. & W. Ry. Co.,25• 
which held: 
"That where the principal has clothed his agent with power 
to do an act upon the existence of some extrinsic fact neces-: 
sarily and peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent, and" 
of the existence of which the act of executing the power is. 
itself a representation, a third person dealing with such agent 
1n entire good faith, pursuant to the apparent power, may 
rely upon the representation and the principal is estopped· 
from denying its truth to his prejudice. * * * It is the nat-· 
ural and necessary expectation of the carrier issuing them 
[bills of lading] that they will pass freely from one to an-
other and advances be made upon their faith, and the carrier 
has no right to believe, and never does believe, that their 
"'(1890) 44 Minn. 224. 
"(1906) 42 \Vash. 572, 85 Pac. 53. 
""(1887) 106 N. Y. 195. 
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office and effect is limited to the person to whom they are 
first and directly issued. On the contrary, he is bound by 
law to recognize the validity of transfers and to deliver the 
property upon the production and cancellation of the bill of 
lading. * * * It is obvious also, upon the case as presented, 
that the fact or condition essential to the authority of the 
agent to issue bills of lading was one unknown to the bank 
and peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent and his prin-
cipal. If the rule compelled the transferee to incur the peril 
of the existence or absence of the essential fact, it would 
practically end the large volume of business founded upon 
transfers of bills of lading. Of whom shall the lender in-
quire, and how ascertain the fact? Naturally he would go 
to the freight agent, who had already falsely declared in writ-
ing that the property had been received. Is he any more 
authorized to make the verbal representation than the written 
one? Must the lender get permission to go through the freight 
house or examine the books? If the property is grain, it may 
not be easy to identify, and the books, if disclosed, are the 
work of the same freight agent. It seems very clear that 
the vital fact of the shipment is one peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the carrier and his agent and quite certain to be 
unknown to the transferee of the bill of lading, except as he 
relies upon the representation of the freight agent." 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Brooke v. New York &c. 
R. Co.,26 said: 
"It is contended that,· inasmuch as no authority, real or ap-
parent, to issue bills of lading without receiving the goods 
mentioned therein had actually been given by the railroad 
company to Weiss, it was not in any manner responsible for 
his unauthorized act, even as to innocent third parties who 
were misled and injured thereby. \Ve cannot assent to this 
proposition. As between principal and third parties, the true 
limit of the agent's authority to bind the former is the appar-
ent authority with which the agent is invested; but, as be-
tween the principal and the agent, the true limit is the express 
authority or instruction given to the agent. EvANs's AGEN-
CY, 594; Adams Express Co. v. Schlessinger, 75 Pa. St. 246. 
The principal is bound by all the acts of his agent within the 
20 (1885) 108 Pa. St. 529. 
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scope of the authority which he held him out to the world to 
possess, notwithstanding the agent acted contrary to instruc-
tions; and this is especially the case with officers and ao-ents 
?f ~orporations. ?ince a corporation acts only through a;ents, 
1t 1s bound by its agents' contracts when made ostensibly 
within the range of their office. * * * It is conceded in this 
case that the company did not authorize the issuance of bills 
of lading without receipt of the goods, but it put Weiss in its 
place to do that class of acts, and it should be answerable for 
the manner in which he conducted himself within the range 
of his agency. Public policy, as well as the ultimate good of 
corporations themselves, requires that this should be the mle."· 
In the United States there has been considerable discussion as to-
the position of a carrier when a cargo has been received and the mas-
ter or agent through mistake or accident gives a receipt for a greater 
quantity than he has received. The decisions have been conflicting 
but the weight of authority seems to be in favor of holding the car-
rier liable to an innocent holder for value of such a bill of lading. 
The Pomerene Act. 
The Pomerene Act is practically Tm~ UNIFORM BILL oF LADING 
Acr now in force in fifteen states and in Alaska, carriers being 
liable to the shippers in nine other states by court decisions or by 
statute law. 
While the bill was before Congress, lengthy hearings took place 
before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the 
House of Representatives. 
Many well known lawyers, and railway and steamship representa-
tives appeared before the Committee, the United States Chamber of 
Commerce being represented by Charles S. Haight, Counselor-at-
Law, of New York City who acted in 19!0 for the Italian Cotton 
Spinn~rs in connection with the famous Knight-Yancy bill of lading 
frauds. 
The possibilities of fraud under the law exempting the carrier from 
liability are well illustrated by the Knight-Yancy and the LeMore & 
Co. cases. In 1905 Knight, a cotton exporter who lived in Alabama 
but whose company was in Louisiana, had apparently gone short on 
the market and lost. He forged the names of railroad agents to enough 
bills to satisfy his immediate needs, drew against buyers in Europe, 
and then discounted the drafts and with the proceeds bought cotton 
to cover his previous commitments. The forged documents were · 
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outstanding with no cotton to cover them. He then forged other 
bills of lading, discounted them and purchased cotton to cover the 
.first forgeries. He next prepared bills of lading exactly like those 
first forged and presented them for signature to the agent whose 
name he had forged and then suppressed the originals and allowed 
the cotton to go forward and be delivered to the holder of the first 
forged bills. He followed this system for five years and when the 
.disclosure came he was only 6o days behind in his shipments to the 
Italian Cotton Spinners, but he had at least $s,ooo,ooo worth of bills 
.outstanding on which no cotton had been shipped. 
Strangely enough no jury in the State of Alabama was asked to 
.con".ict him for the violation of the State law. Locally he appears 
to have been considered to be a benefactor, as he had bought more 
·Cotton than any other dealer, had paid better prices and had made 
his European customers-not his friends-suffer the loss. When he 
was tried under the Federal law for misuse of the mails the defense 
was successfully raised that the fraudulent bills of lading had been 
mailed by the bankers. 
LeMore & Co. were stave importers with branches in Liverpool 
and on the continent. They induced two steamship agents at New 
Orleans to issue "accommodation bills of lading." They would draw 
drafts against those bills of lading. The drafts when presented in 
Europe were at once accepted by the drawees, who were accomplices, 
and who detached the bills of lading, presumably to get delivery of 
the goods and then the bills of lading were returned to New Orleans 
.and again taken by LeMore to the steamship company which was 
.asked to return LeMore's guarantee that the carriers would be pro-
tected against any liability for having issued bills of lading without 
the receipt of the staves. 
It is claimed that the losses to European buyers in these two cases 
amounted to $u,ooo,ooo. 
At the hearing before the Congressional Committee it was urged 
by Mr. Haight, on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the Uni-
ted States, that it was in the intere£:t of the small dealer that the car-
rier should be liable to the innocent holder for value of a bill of lad-
ing. He said: 
"The small dealer needs an honest bill of lading to do his 
business. Indeed, he must have it. The big concerns, which 
have been in business for forty or fifty years and have mil-
lions of capital and partners in Liverpool, Texas, and New 
Orleans, are not interested in anything that makes for a really 
safe bill of lading, because the more dangerous the bill of 
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lading the greater their profits. As they put it, 'The commer-
cial world knows our responsibility and trusts us, and if the 
small man is driven out by risky conditions surrounding his 
bill of lading we can buy and sell all the cotton there is.' " 
Mr. Haight was asked: "Has England suffered to any extent by 
reason of frauds?" He replied: "I am rather ashamed to say that 
the fraudulent bill of lading seems to have been more popular in this 
country than on the other side. But that is due, perhaps, not to their 
greater honesty but to the fact that if you run a train more than 8 
hours in any direction in England you run off into the water. They 
have no long rail hauls such as we have and their dishonest shippers 
lack the facilities for fraud which arise when cotton is moving by 
rail from Texas to Boston, and then to Liverpool. I have known 
.cotton to take more than three months, literally, to move by rail 
from Texas to Boston, and the shipper always says, when he has not 
shipped it, that it is a question of railroad delay and congestion. Let 
me tell you what Knight did. He said, when buyers complained that 
his cotton did not arrive, 'Gen~lemen, I am exceedingly sorry. Our 
railroad facilities are hopelessly inadequate. The cotton ought to 
have reached you in 6o days. It is now 90 days, and I enclose you 
my cheque for the interest on ypur money for the extra 30 days.' 
And the honest and innocent people on the other .side said, 'While 
Knight's cotton does come along rather slowly, and geographically 
he may not be located at a point very convenient for the shipment of 
-cotton, personally he is a perfect gentleman'.'' · 
· The provisions of the PoMERENE ACT may be summarized as 
follows: 
This Act exercises jurisdiction over bills of lading covering: 
I. Transportation within any Territory of the United States 
or District of Columbia. 
2. From a State to a foreign country. 
3. From one State to another State. 
4. Between points in the same State when transported through 
another State or foreign country. 
Xinds of bills to be used: 
1. Straight bill is when consigned or destined to a specified 
person. 
(a) Such bills are non-negotiable and shall be so marked. 
(b) Same limitation not to apply to acknowledgements of 
of an informal character. 
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2. Order bill is when goods are consigned to order of any-
person. 
(a) Such bills always negotiable. 
( r) Unless made non-negotiable by the shipper in 
agreement in writing. 
(b) Order bills may not be issued in parts or sets 
( r) Except when shipments are to Alaska and Panama .. 
(2) If issued in parts or sets carrier will be held liable-
to anyone who purchases a part for value in good 
faith even though such purchase is made after-
delivery of foe goods. 
(3) These provisions not to forbid issuing of order-
bills in parts or sets on goods to Alaska, Panama, 
Porto Rico, the Phipippines, Hawaii, or foreign 
countries. 
(4) Order bills issued on goods shipped to places other-
than those excepted in (3) issued in series, shalt 
be marked "duplicate." 
( c) Insertion of name of person to be notified of arrival!. 
of goods not to limit negotiability of order bills. 
Carriers compelled to make delivery, in absence of lawful excuse:: 
I. To the consignee named in a straight bill. 
2. To the holder of an order bill, if the demand is accompaniecb. 
by 
(a) An offer to satisfy carrier's lawful lien upon goods. 
(b) Offer to surrender bill properly indorsed. 
( c) Willingness to sign receipt for delivery of goods. 
3. Failure to deliver under such circumstances, makes burden:. 
of proof upon carrier to esta:blish lawful excuse. 
4. Carrier is justified in making delivery under following con-
ditions: 
(a) To a person lawfully entitled to possession of goods. 
(b) To consignee named in a straight bill. 
( c) To person possessing an order bill 
( r) Which states goods are to be delivered to his.. 
order. 
(2) Which has been indorsed to him, or iri blank, by-
consignee. 
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~iability for quantity and quality of the shipment: 
I. When loaded by carrier, the carrier must 
(a) Count the packages when it is package freight. 
(b) Ascertain the kind and quantity when bulk freight. 
( c) Insertions in the bill that it is the shipper'"' s weight, load 
and count will be held to be void. 
2. When loaded by the shipper and the bill states it is the 
shipper's weight, load and count 
(a) Carrier must ascertain kind and quantity .. 
('b) Carrier not liable for improper loading or misdescrip-
tion of goods in the bill of lading. 
3. When carrier has facilities .at hand, and the shipment is 
bulk freight, request being made in writing 
(a) Shipper's weight, load and count may be verified by 
carrier's agent. 
(b) Then "Shipper's weight,'' etc., shall not be inserted in 
bill. 
Carrier's liability for' acts of its agent: 
I. When a bill is issued by a carrier's agent of actual or ap-
parent authority, the carrier is liable 
(a) To the owner of goods covered in.a straight bill. 
·(b) To the bonafide holder for value of an order bill. 
( c) Although goods are not received by carrier or are mis-
directed. 
Forgeries or alterations are to be judged misdemeanors punish-
able by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or by fine not ex-
ceeding $s,ooo, or both. 
H. S. Ross. 
Montreal, Canada. 
